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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of capital flows to and from Africa presents a stunning paradox. On 
the one hand, African countries are heavily indebted and must make difficult decisions 
with regard to the allocation of national resources between debt payments and provision 
of vital social services to their populations. Over the past decades, African countries have 
been forced by external debt burdens to undertake painful economic adjustments while 
devoting scarce foreign exchange to debt-service payments. On the other hand, African 
countries have experienced massive outflows of private capital towards Western financial 
centers. Indeed, these private assets surpass the continent’s foreign liabilities, ironically 
making sub-Saharan Africa a “net creditor” to the rest of the world (Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2001). Compared to other developing regions, Africans tend to exhibit a 
significantly higher preference for foreign assets relative to domestic assets; hence Africa 
has the highest proportion of private assets held abroad (Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 
2001).  
 
Some of the private assets held abroad by Africans may well be legally acquired. 
But the legitimacy of a significant part of these assets is questionable. This is especially 
the case for the wealth held by African political and economic élites in international 
financial centers that provide the coveted secrecy of banking operations. Recently, 
international pressure on Swiss banks has uncovered large sums of money belonging to 
former African rulers including Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Mobutu of the Congo   2
(former Zaïre). These may be only the tip of the iceberg of looted African national 
resources. 
 
The problem of capital flight from African economies deserves serious attention 
for several reasons. First, capital flight constitutes a diversion of scarce resources away 
from domestic investment and other productive activities. In recent decades, African 
economies have achieved significantly lower investment levels than other developing 
countries (International Financial Corporation, 1998; Ndikumana, 2000). Moreover, 
evidence in the literature shows that the African continent is the most capital-scarce 
among all developing regions (Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001: 59). Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Pattillo (2001) estimate that if Africa were able to attract back the flight component 
of private wealth, domestic private capital stock would rise by about two-thirds. These 
authors find that capital flight carries high social costs in terms of lost output: Africa’s 
GDP per capita is estimated to be 16 percent lower than it would be if the continent had 
been able to retain its private wealth at home (p. 60). The hemorrhage of capital is likely 
to be accompanied by losses of human capital due not only to outmigration but also to 
missed opportunities for “learning-by-doing” amongst entrepreneurs and financial 
institutions (Nyarko 2007).  
 
Second, capital flight is likely to have pronounced regressive effects on the 
distribution of wealth. The individuals who engage in capital flight generally are 
members of the subcontinent’s economic and political élites, who take advantage of their 
privileged positions to acquire and channel funds abroad. Both the acquisition and the   3
transfer of funds often involve legally questionable practices, including the falsification 
of trade documents (trade misinvoicing), the embezzlement of export revenues, and 
kickbacks on public and private sector contracts (see, for example, Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 1998). The negative effects of the resulting shortages of revenue and foreign 
exchange fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the less wealthy members of the 
society. The regressive impact of capital flight is compounded when financial imbalances 
result in devaluation: the wealthy who hold external assets are insulated from the effects, 
while the poor enjoy no such cushion. 
 
A third reason for greater attention to African capital flight is that most sub-
Saharan African countries remain in the grip of a severe external debt crisis. By 2000, 
debt service amounted to 3.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) for sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) as a whole. By comparison, SSA countries spent 2.4% of GDP on health in that 
year. Only 55% of the people in SSA have access to clean drinking water, while illiteracy 
rates and infant mortality rates in SSA are among the highest in the world (UNECA 
2007). Insofar as the proceeds of external borrowing were used not to the benefit of the 
African public, but rather to finance the accumulation of private external assets by the 
ruling élites, the moral and legal legitimacy of these debt-service obligations is open to 
challenge. We discuss this issue further in the paper. 
 
The debate over strategies to increase development financing in Africa must 
include a discussion of the policies to curb the continent’s hemorrhage of capital, as well 
as strategies for inducing repatriation of capital legally held by Africans abroad. Efforts   4
to recover African wealth that was acquired illicitly and is now held abroad will meet 
resistance both from the holders of the assets and from their bankers in the West. While 
economic reforms in African countries may attract the return of legally acquired assets 
(as well as foreign direct investment), repatriation of illicit capital and the prevention of 
future illicit outflows will require a concerted effort by the international political and 
financial community to increase transparency and accountability in international banking 
practice.  
 
The first objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive set of estimates of 
capital flight for a sample of 40 African countries over the period of 1970-2004 to help in 
assessing the magnitude of the capital fight phenomenon. Second, the paper reviews the 
literature on the causes of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa as a way of identifying 
the factors that may be reversed by appropriate policy responses. Third, we provide new 
econometric evidence on the linkages between external borrowing and capital flight, one 
of the key relationships identified in the empirical literature. We confirm the robustness 
of the debt-capital flight relationships by estimating the capital flight equation using a 
proxy of capital flight that is independent of debt in its construction. This proxy is bank 
deposits held by African non-bank private agents in Western banks. Bank deposits are 
one of the means by which smuggled funds are held abroad and thus are related to our 
measure of capital flight. Thus we are able to confidently conclude that the strong 
relationship between capital flight and external borrowing is not a spurious relationship 
arising from the definition of capital flight that we use in the paper. Fourth, the paper 
discusses strategies to prevent and reverse capital flight with a special emphasis on the   5
rationale for advocating the doctrine of odious debt for the repudiation of illegitimate 
debts. The paper closes with a summary of the evidence and the arguments. 
 
2.  Magnitude of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.1  New estimates of capital flight over the 1970-2004 period 
 
Existing studies reveal large amounts of capital outflows from sub-Saharan 
African countries over the past decades. The estimated magnitudes of capital flight have 
varied, primarily due to differences in data and time-period coverage.
1 The standard 
methodology is to calculate capital flight as the residual difference between capital 
inflows and recorded foreign-exchange outflows. For country i in year t, capital flight is 
computed as follows (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001):  
it it it it it it MISINV RES CA DFI DEBTADJ KF + Δ + − + Δ = ) (            (1) 
where  DEBTADJ Δ  is the change in the country’s stock of external debt (adjusted for 
cross-currency exchange rate fluctuations, so as to take into account the fact that debt is 
denominated in various currencies and then aggregated in US dollars); DFI is net direct 
foreign investment; CA is the current account deficit;  RES Δ  is the change in the stock of 
international reserves; and MISINV is net trade misinvoicing. This method is a variant of 
the one used by the World Bank (1985) among others, based on the difference between 
the inflows of foreign exchange from external borrowing (as reported in the World 
Bank’s  World Debt Tables) and the uses of foreign exchange reported in the IMF’s 
                                                 
1 For discussions of the methodology for the computation of capital flight, see Lessard and Williamson 
(1987); Ajayi (1997); and Boyce and Ndikumana (2001).    6
Balance-of-Payments Tables. Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) refine this measure by 
incorporating adjustments for trade misinvoicing and for the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on the dollar value of external debt.  
 
In this study, we include two further innovations to the method of computation of 
capital flight. First, we adjust the change in debt to account for debt write-offs. Debt 
write-offs reduce the stock of debt although they have no corresponding flow of debt 
service. Hence, they lead to an overstatement of debt service and an understatement of 
the change in debt obtained as the change in annual debt stocks over consecutive years. 
Second, we include an adjustment for underreporting of remittances. A detailed 
description of the algorithm we use to compute capital flight is provided in Appendix A. 
 
The annual flows of capital flight for the 40 sub-Saharan African countries over 
the 1970-2004 period (in million of 2004 dollars) are given in Table B1 in the appendix.
2 
Table 1 summarizes these data. Real capital flight over the 35-year period amounted to 
about $420 billion (in 2004 dollars) for the 40 countries as a whole. Including imputed 
interest earnings, the accumulated stock of capital flight was about $607 billion as of end-
2004. Together, this group of SSA countries is a “net creditor” to the rest of the world in 
the sense that their private assets held abroad, as measured by capital flight including 
interest earnings, exceed their total liabilities as measured by the stock of external debt. 
Their net external assets (accumulated flight capital minus accumulated external debt) 
amounted to approximately $398 billion over the 35-year period. To give a sense of the 
                                                 
2 Boyce and Ndikumana (2003) report estimates of capital flight for the period 1970-96 for a sample of 30 
countries included in this study. For these countries and this period, we simply convert these series to 2004 
dollars, and add the further adjustments for debt write-off and unrecorded remittances.    7
relative magnitude of the region’s net external position, the region’s external assets are 
2.9 times the stock of debts owed to the world. For some individual countries, the results 
are even more dramatic: for Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Nigeria the external 
assets are 4.6, 5.1, 5.3, and 6.7 times higher than their debt stocks, respectively. For some 
countries, the stock of capital flight is negative implying that inflows outweigh outflows 
over the period.  
 
The data indicate that capital flight is not solely a phenomenon dating from the 
onset of the debt crisis of the 1980s (see Ndikumana and Boyce 2003). The outflows of 
the 1970s were often comparable to, and in some cases greater than, those of more recent 
decades. Over the period, a number of countries appear to have experienced episodes of 
capital flight reversal (that is, net outflows followed by net inflows), but in the period as a 
whole, outflows more than outweigh inflows for all but seven countries in the sample 
(Benin, Comoros, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). 
 
2.2 International  comparisons 
 
The existing evidence suggests that capital flight from African countries 
constitutes a heavier burden compared to that of other developing regions, even though 
the absolute volumes are arguably lower. Chang and Cumby (1991) examined a sample 
of 36 African countries from 1976 to 1987 and found that with the exception of Nigeria, 
the absolute levels of capital flight from individual African countries were smaller than 
those from Latin American countries, but that relative to external debt and GDP, African   8
countries experienced higher capital flight than their Latin American counterparts. 
Hermes and Lensink (1992)
3 also found that while total capital flight from sub-Saharan 
African countries is smaller than that from Latin American countries, the burden of 
capital flight (as a percent of GDP) is higher: 61% for the sub-Saharan sample compared 
to 22% for Latin America (also see Murinde, Hermes, and Lensink, 1996). 
 
Empirical evidence also shows that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest ratio of 
private capital held abroad in the form of capital flight. Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 
(2001) find that in 1990 about 40 percent of African private capital was held abroad, the 
highest ratio in the developing world. In a subsequent study, these authors find that 
capital flight increased in the 1990s compared to the 1980s and that Africa continues to 
lead other regions in capital flight (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo, 2004).  
 
3.  Causes of capital flight from Africa:  Literature review 
 
To devise strategies for curbing capital flight and inducing the repatriation of 
private wealth held outside of Africa, it is important to understand the forces that drive 
capital flight from the continent in the first place. In this section, we review the existing 
econometric evidence on the determinants of capital flight to shed light on factors that 
may be influenced by appropriate policy initiatives. The review is by no means 
exhaustive, as we limit ourselves to the findings that are most prominent (robust) and 
                                                 
3 The study by Hermes and Lensink (1992) covers six countries (Congo-Zaïre, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) over the period 1976 to 1989.  They used the somewhat narrower ‘non-
bank’ definition of capital flight proposed by Morgan Guaranty Trust (1986), which excludes assets held 
abroad by domestic banks.     9
most closely linked to policy. For a more extensive review of the empirical evidence, see 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003). 
 
3.1  Debt and capital fight: a two-way relationship 
 
Empirical evidence indicates that the annual flows of external borrowing 
constitute the most consistent determinant of capital flight. In a sample of 30 sub-Saharan 
countries over the period 1970-96, Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) found that for every 
dollar of external borrowing by a SSA country in a given year, on average, roughly 80 
cents leave the country as capital flight. Their results also support the hypothesis that debt 
overhang has an independent effect on capital flight: a one-dollar increase in the stock of 
debt adds an estimated 3.5 cents to annual capital flight in subsequent years. Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2004) report an almost identical result, with a one dollar increase 
in the stock of debt leading to 3.2 cents of capital flight. 
 
The causal relationships between capital flight and external debt can run both 
ways; that is, foreign borrowing can cause capital flight, while at the same time capital 
flight can lead to more external borrowing. Boyce (1992) distinguishes four possible 
causal links. First, foreign borrowing causes capital flight by contributing to an increased 
likelihood of a debt crisis, worsening macroeconomic conditions, and the deterioration of 
the investment climate. In such cases of debt-driven capital flight, “capital flees a country 
in response to economic circumstances attributable to the external debt itself” (Boyce 
1992: 337). High levels of debt also may be interpreted as a signal of higher tax rates in   10
the future as the government seeks to service the debt. These effects will deter domestic 
investment while inducing capital flight.  
 
Secondly, foreign borrowing provides the resources as well as a motive for 
channeling private capital abroad, a phenomenon Boyce (1992: 338) terms debt-fueled 
capital flight. In such cases, funds borrowed abroad (by the government or by private 
borrowers with government guarantees) are re-exported as private assets. In some cases, 
the funds may never even leave the creditor bank, simply being transferred into an 
international private banking account at the same institution (Henry 1986).  
 
In the other two linkages, capital flight causes foreign borrowing. In the case of 
flight-driven  external borrowing, capital flight drains national foreign exchange 
resources, forcing the government to borrow abroad.
4 In the case of flight-fueled external 
borrowing, flight capital directly provides the resources to finance foreign loans to the 
same residents who export their capital, a phenomenon known as “round-tripping” or 
“back-to-back loans,” motivated by the desire to obtain government guarantees on 
foreign borrowing, or by the need to devise a pretext for unexplained wealth.  
 
3.2  Hysteresis in capital flight 
 
The evidence in the literature reveals that capital flight tends to persist over time: 
all else equal, past capital flight “causes” more capital flight, which suggests hysteresis in 
                                                 
4 Kahn (1991, p. iv) suggests that in the South African case, in some periods “the need to finance capital 
flight might account for all the accumulation of external debt.”   11
the dynamics of capital flight. Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) interpret this result as a 
habit formation effect, as private actors gain experience in smuggling capital abroad. The 
result may also reflect a contagion effect, as capital flight corrodes the legitimacy of 
capital controls, particularly if the flight capitalists include government authorities. At the 
same time, capital flight may contribute to the deterioration of the macroeconomic 
environment, in turn sparking further capital flight. Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2004) 
find that the effects of past capital flight last up to a decade, suggesting that portfolio 
adjustment is a slow process. This suggests that it may take a long time before countries 
are able to reap the dividends from policy reforms aimed at curbing capital flight.  
 
3.3  Good economic performance as a deterrent of capital flight 
 
Good economic performance, measured simply in terms of higher economic 
growth, is associated with lower capital flight (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003). Higher 
economic growth is a signal of higher expected returns on domestic investment, which 
induces further domestic investment and thus reduces capital flight. High and sustained 
economic growth also gives confidence to domestic investors about the institutional and 
governance environment of the country. It constitutes the most palpable evidence that the 
country’s institutions and governance system are favorable for private economic activity, 
whereas stagnation and economic decline are an indication that the government has lost 
control over the economy.  
 
3.4  Political risk induces capital flight   12
 
High political risk has played a significant role in the capital hemorrhage 
experienced by sub-Saharan African countries over the past decades. In a case study of 
South Africa, Fedderke and Liu (2002) find that both the change in political rights 
dispensation and an index of political instability are positively related to capital flight. In 
a cross-country study, Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2004) find that more durable 
regimes experience significantly less capital flight, while countries prone to civil wars 
experience higher capital flight. However, the result on the effects of regime durability 
should be taken with some caution given the history of political change in Africa. 
Frequent regime changes are typically associated with higher political instability, which 
discourages domestic investment and induces capital flight. It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that durable regimes are associated with a better political environment. 
Some regimes in Africa have persisted because they were able to establish an oppressive 
apparatus that suppressed demand for political opening. Examples include the regimes of 
Mobutu in the Congo and Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Such regimes are associated with high 
risk of expropriation and uncertainty, which deters domestic investment and induces 
capital flight. Moreover, under such regimes, capital flight is high as government leaders 
engage in smuggling the country’s assets, including natural resources, borrowed funds, 
and official aid (for evidence on the case of the Congo, see Ndikumana and Boyce, 
1998). 
 
3.5  Corruption induces capital flight 
   13
Corruption has figured prominently in discussions of the problem of capital flight 
from sub-Saharan Africa. There are various ways to understand the effects of corruption 
on capital flight. First, capital flight consists of assets which often are acquired illegally 
domestically and channeled abroad illegally as well. Corruption facilitates both the illegal 
acquisition as well as the illegal transfer of private assets. Secondly, countries experience 
high capital flight partly as a result of its “contagious” nature. As government officials 
engage in capital smuggling and embezzlement of national resources, private agents are 
induced to engage also in illicit transfers of assets abroad as a result of the collapse of the 
mechanisms of control and accountability. In general, high levels of corruption are a 
symptom of failure of the governance system, which results in high economic risk. In 
such an environment, private agents cannot fully internalize the costs of corruption and 
choose to hold assets abroad as a means of hedging against uncertainty. 
 
Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo (2004) suggest that the role of corruption may 
explain the differential behavior of financial capital flight relative to that of human 
capital flight from Africa. Their study finds that “the Africa dummy” is significant for 
financial capital flight, but not for human capital flight. That is, Africa tends to have 
higher financial capital flight than predicted by their model, but that this is not the case 
for human capital flight. One possible explanation is that while financial capital is related 




                                                 
5 Note also that the lower human capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa is partly due to the fact that the 
authors consider immigration to the United States only.  In practice, African migration is primarily an intra-
Africa phenomenon, due not only to geographic distance but also political distance vis-à-vis the West.   14
3.6  Price distortions induce capital flight 
 
Agents choose to hold assets abroad to shield their portfolios from the effects of 
changes in relative returns arising from external shocks and policy uncertainty. Empirical 
studies have found a significant effect of the black market premium on capital flight (see 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo, 2004). The black market premium constitutes an effective 
subsidy on assets held abroad and symmetrically a levy on assets held domestically. 
Market distortions therefore can have important regressive effects, disproportionately 
hurting the general public relative to the political and economic élites who are able to 
hold assets abroad. 
 
4.  External debt and capital flight: New evidence for sub-Saharan African 
countries 
 
4.1  Estimation methodology 
 
The econometric analysis in this study builds on existing research on the 
determinants of capital flight from sub-Saharan African countries. In particular we 
explore further our earlier findings that show a positive and significant relationship 
between capital flight and both annual flows of external borrowing and the cumulative 
stock of external debt, suggesting that capital flight is both debt-fueled and debt-driven 
(Ndikumana and Boyce 2003). In other words, external borrowing appears to provide 
resources for capital flight while growing indebtedness provides a motive for private   15
agents to export capital. Earlier evidence also shows that capital flight exhibits a high 
degree of hysteresis, or persistence. Furthermore, it is negatively related to the growth 
rate of per capita GDP, possibly implying that growth is a signal for returns to domestic 
capital so that high growth is a disincentive for exporting capital and an incentive for 
investing domestically.  
 
Based on this evidence, we formulate the econometric model as follows: 
it i it it
q
j
j t i j it growth DEBT KF KF ε η α α θ + + ′ + + + =∑
=
− X β 2 1
1
,            (2) 
where for a country i at time t, KF is the ratio of real capital flight to GDP (and j = 1…q 
is the number of lags), DEBT is alternatively the ratio of the annual inflows of debt 
(change in debt stock) to GDP or the ratio of the debt stock to GDP (we also run 
regressions with change in debt and the stock of debt simultaneously), growth is real 
GDP growth rate, X is a vector of control variables,  i η  is a country-specific intercept 
representing unobservable individual country characteristics, and ε is a white-noise error 
term.  
 
Among control variables we explore are the effects of the macroeconomic environment, 
interest rate differentials, financial development, natural resources, and governance. An 
unstable macroeconomic environment increases uncertainty over expected returns to 
domestic capital, which reduces incentives for investing domestically, thus inducing 
capital flight. We proxy macroeconomic uncertainty by inflation variability, measured as   16
the absolute value of the difference between actual inflation and predicted inflation
6. 
Including the real interest rate differential – proxied by the real US Treasury bill rate 
minus the African country’s real deposit rate – permits us to test whether the 
conventional portfolio theory assumption that capital flight is driven by higher world 
interest rates relative to domestic rates. As a measure of financial development, we use 
bank credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP. The natural resource endowment is 
included as a potential source for both exportable funds and embezzlement of exports. As 
a proxy for this, we use the share of fuel exports in the country’s total exports. We 
7explore the role of governance
8 by interacting natural resources with a polity measure. 
The rationale for this interaction is that a natural resource-rich country with a corrupt 
regime will experience more capital flight as the leaders embezzle the proceeds of 
exports and channel them into private assets held abroad. Summary statistics for the 
regression variables are provided in Table B2 in the Appendix. 
 
In the estimation of the above equation, we pay due attention to potential causes 
of biases in the estimates, which especially arise in the context of panel data. In addition 
to country-specific fixed effects, we account for outliers by using the robust ordinary 
least squares estimation technique.. We also account for potential simultaneity between 
external borrowing and capital flight. As discussed above and more extensively in past 
studies (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce 2003), the relationship 
                                                 
6 Predicted inflation is obtained from a linear regression of inflation on time. 
 
7 “Fuel exports” consist of “mineral fuels” (SITC Section 3) as reported in the World Bank Africa Database 
(and World Development Indicators). 
 
8 As a proxy of governance we used the Polity2 index from Polity IV Project’s database which ranges from 
–10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).    17
between capital flight and external borrowing can run both ways. While external 
borrowing provides both resources and a motivation for capital flight, the latter in turn 
can cause more external borrowing as it drains government resources. We account for 
this potential source of bias by using the instrumental variable estimation technique 
(where debt is considered endogenous).
9 
 
4.2  Discussion of the results 
 
The revolving door effects: Debt flows and capital flight 
 
The results in Table 2 clearly indicate a positive and significant relationship 
between capital flight and the annual inflows of external debt (change in the stock of 
debt). The first column of the table contains results with robust OLS estimation, the 
second regression results adding country fixed effects, and the last results from the 
instrumental variable approach where change in debt is considered endogenous.  
 
The results in all cases show a statistically significant and economically large 
effect of external borrowing on capital flight. The estimated coefficient on change in debt 
implies that up to 62 cents out of each dollar borrowed abroad between 1970 and 2004 
has left sub-Saharan Africa in the form of capital flight. The results provide strong 
                                                 
9 We also attempted the more general instrumental method, the GMM technique, which however performed 
poorly for this sample of countries: diagnostic tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
invalid and also fail to reject the hypothesis that second-order autocorrelation coefficient is significant. The 
results are not reproduced here.   18
support for the revolving door phenomenon, or debt-fueled capital flight, whereby 
borrowed funds are captured and converted into private assets in foreign banks. 
 
The debt overhang effect: Debt stock and capital flight 
 
The results reported in Table 2 also show a strong positive effect of the stock of 
external debt on capital flight. The results again are robust to country-specific effects and 
any potential two-way causation between capital flight and debt as can be seen in the 
regressions with the instrumental variable approach where external debt is considered 
endogenous (column 6). 
 
These results also indicate that the effect of external debt on capital flight is 
economically meaningful. They suggest that an increase in the stock of debt by one dollar 
leads to 3 to 4 cents of capital flight in subsequent years. There are two related possible 
explanations for this effect. First, in a highly indebted country, investors may expect that 
future economic performance will be lower, implying lower overall returns to investment. 
This reduces incentives for investing domestically, encouraging capital flight. Second, 
private agents may expect that high future debt service obligations associated with high 
debt stock will force the government to raise more taxes to meet debt service 
commitments. Higher future taxes reduce expected after-tax returns to capital, which 
further reduce incentives for investing domestically, leading to higher capital flight. 
   19
In the last column of Table 2, both the debt flow and debt stock are included 
simultaneously in the regression. The coefficients on both the flow and the stock 
measures are statistically significant. This specification incorporates both the debt-fueled 
capital flight (with change in debt) and debt-driven capital flight (with debt stock) 
channels. As the results indicate, the linkages between capital flight and external 
borrowing in this sample of African countries operate through both channels. In the 
following exploration of the effects of other factors, we use this specification that 





The regression results show that other factors also play an important role in 
explaining capital flight from sub-Saharan countries. Consistent with evidence in past 
studies (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003), the results indicate that capital flight is a 
phenomenon with a high tendency to persist over time. High levels of capital flight in the 
past are associated with high levels of capital flight in the future. This is illustrated by the 
large positive and significant coefficients on lagged capital flight. 
 
Also consistent with evidence in the literature, economic growth acts as a 
deterrent to capital flight. This may be because investors interpret high growth 
performance as an indicator of high overall returns to capital in the country, thus 
discouraging capital flight.    20
 
Table 3 reports the results for the effects of measures of macroeconomic 
instability (inflation variability), the real interest rate differential, financial development 
(credit/GDP), natural resource endowments (fuel exports), and governance. The results 
indicate that the inflation effect is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This suggests that to some extent, macroeconomic instability plays an important role in 
portfolio decisions by investors. High uncertainty over inflation discourages domestic 
investment by raising the discount rate applied to expected profitability of investment. As 
a result, more savings flow into foreign assets. Investors may also interpret inflation 
variability as a sign of lack of control by the government over the macroeconomic policy, 
which reduces confidence in the performance of the local economy.  
 
  Somewhat surprisingly, the results show that the real interest rate differential does 
not have a statistically significant impact on capital flight. This suggests that other 
motivations – such as the desire to safeguard illicit wealth – have been more important 
than conventional portfolio investment criteria in explaining capital flight from sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
The results indicate that financial development has no impact on capital flight. 
Financial development is proxied by the ratio of bank credit to the private sector over 
GDP. The evidence does not support the presumption that the development of the 
financial system, and the ease of conducting transactions that accompany it, may 
facilitate the export of capital. Indeed, the SSA countries with the most developed   21
financial systems have relatively low levels of capital flight (e.g., Kenya, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, South Africa). 
 
We investigated the effects of natural resource endowment on capital flight, under 
the premise that natural resource exports are subject to embezzlement by leaders as well 
as smuggling and misinvoicing by private operators, which would lead to a high 
correlation between natural resource endowment and capital flight. This exercise is 
severely hindered by the poor quality of data on natural resource exports. We 
experimented with various measures of natural resource endowment, including the share 
of various natural resources in total exports as well as a dummy taking the value of one if 
the share of natural resources in total exports is greater than 75% and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient on the share of fuel exports in total exports is positive and statistically 
significant in robust OLS estimations (not reported here), but it becomes statistically 
insignificant (and negative) when country-specific fixed effects are included (Table 3). 
This is not surprising given that natural resource endowment is likely to be one of the key 
country fixed effects that is unaccounted for in the OLS.  
 
One possible linkage between capital flight and natural resource endowments is 
that the exports proceeds are embezzled by leaders. This would imply that the link would 
be stronger under non-democratic regimes, suggesting that the nature of the quality of 
governance affects the resource-capital flight link. We explore this possibility by adding 
to the regression the polity index of the quality of governance and its interaction with the 
share of fuel exports. We expect the coefficient on the polity indicator to be negative,   22
implying that more democratic regimes (with a higher value of the index) experience less 
capital flight than more autocratic ones. Contrary to this expectation, the estimated 
coefficient on the polity indicator is positive and statistically significant.
10 The coefficient 
on fuel exports and the interaction term both are statistically insignificant (Table 3).  
 
Further robustness tests of the debt-capital flight link 
 
One possible concern with our econometric estimates of the relationship between 
capital flight and external borrowing is that the results may be driven by the way in which 
our measure of capital flight is constructed. Given that the change in the stock of debt is 
one component of the capital flight measure, errors in this variable could lead to a 
spurious relation. To address this concern, we re-estimate the model using a proxy for 
capital flight that is unrelated to the data on debt. This proxy is the deposits held by non-
bank African agents in Western banks (that is, the liabilities of foreign banks vis-à-vis the 
African non-bank private sector.
11 Reported holdings in Western banks represent only a 
fraction of capital flight; this measure omits non-bank financial holdings, real estate and 
other property holdings, and bank holdings for which the African identity of the depositor 
is concealed, as well as capital flight that was used to finance overseas consumption. 
Hence the proxy measure is much smaller than our measure of total capital flight. For the 
40 African countries in our sample, recorded bank deposits in 2004 amounted to $35.3 
                                                 
10  Again the use of country fixed effects, which mask inter-country differences in the polity index,  may be 
part of the explanation.  Summary statistics for our sample show that capital flight is lowest in countries 
with either the most democratic or the most autocratic regimes, and highest in countries in the intermediate 
range.  
 
11 These data are published by the Bank for International Settlements, available online at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.   23
billion, less than 10 percent of our measure of cumulative capital flight for the 1970-2004 
period ($420 billion in 2004 dollars).
12 
 
The results of the regressions with the foreign bank liabilities vis-à-vis the African 
private sector are reported in Table 4. The results confirm the positive effects of external 
debt, both for annual flows and stock of debt, on capital flight, although as expected the 
estimated magnitude is much smaller. Considering the regression including both the flow 
and stock of debt, the coefficients imply that one dollar of new borrowing results in 15 
cents of deposits by Africans in foreign banks and 10 extra cents in subsequent years. 
These results support the finding in this study and our earlier studies (see Ndikumana and 
Boyce 2003) that there is a clear positive and significant relationship between capital 
flight and external borrowing.  
 
5.  Policies to address the problem 
 
  Policy initiatives to address the problem of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa 
must have two prongs. The first consists of measures to induce repatriation of private 
assets now held abroad by Africans. Here we must distinguish between assets that 
originated in legal activities and assets acquired illicitly, as different policy measures will 
be needed for their repatriation. The second prong consists of policies to prevent future 
                                                 
12 This proxy of capital flight is positively correlated with our measure of capital flight. The correlation 
coefficient (using time series, i.e., including time and cross-sectional dimensions) between capital flight 
and foreign bank liabilities is 0.33 (significant at 1% level); the correlation of the two variables as ratios of 
GDP is 0.08 (significant at 10% level).   24
capital flight. Here a key issue is how to shut the “revolving door” between external 
borrowing and capital flight.  
 
5.1  Inducing repatriation of flight capital 
 
Private assets held abroad by Africans include legally acquired assets as well as 
illicitly obtained assets. Different strategies may be required to repatriate the two types of 
assets. Legally acquired assets are held abroad for purely portfolio choice considerations; 
that is, the savers choose to hold foreign assets to maximize the risk-adjusted returns. 
These assets will be repatriated as domestic risks diminish and domestic returns to assets 
rise relative to foreign returns; that is, as the domestic investment climate improves 
relative to the rest of the world.  
 
Illegally acquired assets are held abroad not so much to maximize the returns on 
assets, but to evade the law. These assets are likely to be held predominantly by 
individuals directly or indirectly connected to the government, who are able to use their 
political power both to acquire the assets and to smuggle them abroad. Owners of these 
assets will be enticed by higher domestic returns only if they have some guarantees of 
immunity against prosecution for fraud and penalties for unpaid taxes. Such guarantees 
would have perverse incentive effects by rewarding malfeasance. Alternatively, these 
assets could be impounded and repatriated by legal action. 
  
Repatriation of legally acquired assets: Improving the domestic investment climate    25
 
Strategies for inducing repatriation of legitimate private assets held abroad by 
Africans revolve around improvement of the domestic investment climate. As these are 
basically the same strategies recommended for attracting foreign direct investment, we 
can draw some lessons from the literature on the determinants of FDI in Africa. The 
literature on foreign direct investment in Africa has emphasized three categories of 
factors that have hindered capital inflows and that need to be addressed in order to 
improve Africa’s locational advantage in the eyes of investors: openness to investment, 
the availability and efficiency of the economic infrastructure, and the quality of 
institutions (see Asiedu 2004a, 2004b; Asiedu and Lien 2003; Morisset 2000). Although 
many sub-Saharan African countries significantly improved these attributes of the 
domestic investment climate in recent years, progress in this respect has been much less 
than what has been observed in other developing regions (Asiedu 2004a). As a result, 
SSA countries in general have become relatively less attractive to international investors. 
In other words, the locational disadvantage of African countries with regard to foreign 
investment has increased.  
 
African countries may need to make some concessions in order to attract private 
assets from abroad. For instance, even legally acquired assets held abroad may be liable 
for unpaid taxes, which may be sizeable enough to constitute a deterrent for disclosure 
and repatriation. One possibility is to grant tax amnesties, or at least tax breaks, to 
repatriated assets. Following the launching of tax amnesty scheme in favor of private 
foreign asset holders in 2001, Italy recorded $30 billion of repatriated funds from Swiss   26
banks (Watts 2002). Although the gains may not be as large for African countries, the 
strategy still deserves serious consideration. 
 
Impoundment and forcible repatriation of illicit assets 
 
The economic policies described above aimed at creating an attractive domestic 
investment environment are not likely to entice the repatriation of illegally acquired 
assets held abroad by Africans. For this category of assets, African countries will have to 
use coercive methods, asserting the people’s moral and legal right to recover these assets. 
The main problem is that such assets generally are carefully concealed with the 
cooperation of Western banks and individuals. 
 
Illicit assets held abroad by Africans are to a large extent the product of the theft 
and smuggling of public funds, including borrowed money. While these assets benefit 
their private individual owners, corresponding liabilities – the debts that financed them – 
fall on the shoulders of the debtor country’s populations. Efforts to recover and repatriate 
illicit private fortunes are one way in which African people and their governments can 
attempt to repair the disjuncture between public external debts and private external assets. 
This is a difficult route, however, since it places the burden of proof squarely on the 
African governments to locate and reclaim the money. The Stolen Asset Recovery 
(STAR) initiative, launched in 2007 by the World Bank and the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime, may help improve prospects for asset recovery. Even so, forcible   27
repatriation efforts offer only limited possibilities for easing sub-Saharan Africa’s public 
external debt burden.  
 
A complementary strategy would be for African countries to repudiate debts that 
financed these private assets, on the ground that these debts are odious. This is equivalent 
to asset repatriation in that it blocks completion of the final step in the “revolving door” 
circuit between external borrowing and capital flight. For Africa, the net capital loss from 
debt-fueled capital flight (and from flight-fueled external borrowing) comes not from the 
initial two-way flows but rather from the resulting debt-service payments (both 
amortization and interest) in subsequent years. While African countries cannot close the 
stable door after the horse has bolted, they can cut their losses insofar as they haven’t yet 
paid for the horse. As discussed below, odious debt repudiation would also help to deter 
future capital flight. 
 
5.2  Preventing future capital flight 
 
The evidence discussed in this paper and earlier studies (Boyce and Ndikumana 
2001; Ndikumana and Boyce 2003) shows that sub-Saharan Africa is a net creditor to the 
rest of the world, in the sense that private assets held abroad exceed the continent’s 
liabilities to the rest of the world. Then the question is, if Africa is a net creditor, why are 
so many of its people so poor? The answer, of course, is that the subcontinent’s private 
external assets belong to a narrow, relatively wealthy stratum of its population, while   28
public external debts are borne by the people through their governments. To the extent 
that these private assets were accumulated using the external borrowings that were 
intended to develop the countries, this raises the question of the legitimacy of much of the 
debts owed by African countries. In other words, there is legal basis for claiming that a 
substantial fraction of Africa’s debts are “odious.” 
 
A country’s debts are considered “odious” if three conditions hold (see Sack 
1927; Khalfan 2003; King 2007; and Howse 2007): (1) absence of consent: the debts 
were incurred without the consent of the people, which is typically the case when the 
debts were borrowed by an undemocratic regime; (2) absence of benefit: the borrowed 
funds were used not for the benefit of the people, but instead for the interests of the 
rulers, possibly including for repression against the same people that these funds were 
nominally intended to help;
13 (3) creditor awareness: creditors were aware or should 
have been aware of conditions (1) and (2).  
 
The doctrine of odious debt draws from both international law and domestic law, 
including that of the United States and United Kingdom, to whose jurisdiction dispute 
resolution often is assigned in loan agreements. One particularly strong backing of the 
doctrine is the principle of domestic agency, which states that “every power of making a 
binding commitment for another person carries with it the special responsibility of acting 
                                                 
13 A good example is the case of debt issued to the apartheid regime in South Africa which by and large 
was used to consolidate the oppressive regime.  Since all the lenders knew very well that the regime was 
illegitimate and violated all human rights, the post-apartheid regime could have claimed that past debts are 
odious.  See Walker and Nattrass (2002) for a discussion of the South African case. 
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in the interest of that person” (Khalfan 2003: 3). Thus, while the agent (the government) 
has the power to make binding debt commitments in the name of the principal (the 
people), it also has the fiduciary obligation of doing so in the latter’s interest. When it 
fails to do so, there is a well-established legal basis for challenging the legitimacy of the 
resulting liability. Moreover, under domestic law in most countries, a third party can be 
held liable for assisting an agent in the breach of his obligation toward his principal. This 
implies that if a bank knowingly assists a government official or private citizen in 
robbing a country, the bank is liable for the losses incurred by the nation and its people.
14 
 
The practice of servicing external debts regardless of the uses to which the 
borrowed money was put gives rise to a moral hazard problem: insured against the risk of 
malfeasance, creditors lack adequate incentives to act to minimize this risk. One way to 
improve international financial governance would be to improve the institutional 
arrangements for repudiation of odious debts. This would encourage due diligence by 
creditors and curtail the phenomenon of debt-fueled capital flight in future years. 
 
The literature on odious debts has outlined two main strategies with regard to the 
question of repayment of debts that are presumed odious. The first strategy is for debtor 
countries to repudiate past debts unilaterally. We refer to this as the ex post strategy. In 
the second strategy, odious debts are defined as loans issued to a government that has 
been designated as “odious” ex ante by an international institution. Under this scenario, 
governments can repudiate those debts incurred after the “odious government” status has 
                                                 
14 For discussion, see Jochnick (2006) and Buchheit et al. (2007).   30
been established and made public by the appropriate international institution. Here we 
discuss both strategies and their implications for African countries. 
 
The ex post repudiation of odious debt 
 
Just as in the case of private assets held abroad by Africans, it is difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate debts and odious debts. Putting the burden of proof on the 
shoulders of debtor countries to establish the “odious” nature of debts in many cases 
could impose insuperable transaction costs. An alternative approach would be to put the 
burden of proof on the creditors to demonstrate the legitimacy of the debts contracted by 
previous dictatorial regimes.
15 Sub-Saharan African governments would inform their 
creditors that outstanding debts will be treated as legitimate if, and only if, the real 
counterparts of the debts can be identified and shown to have benefited the people of the 
country. If the creditors can document where the money went, and show when and how it 
benefited citizens of the borrowing country via investment or consumption, then the debt 
would be regarded as a bona fide external obligation of the government (and hence an 
external asset of the creditor bank or government). But if the fate of the borrowed money 
cannot be traced, then the present African governments must infer that it was diverted 
into private pockets associated with the former regimes, and possibly into capital flight. 
In such cases, it can be argued that the liability for the debt lies not with the current 
                                                 
15  Referring to domestic law, Buchheit et al. (2007, p. 1252) write: “We believe that governmental 
corruption in some countries is so suffocatingly ubiquitous that a U.S. court could legitimately shift onto 
the plaintiff [i.e., a creditor seeking redress for non-repayment] the burden of showing that a particular 
transaction was not tainted by corruption…. Against a showing of pervasive corruption, is it unreasonable 
to ask the plaintiff/lender to explain how it alone had managed to preserve its virtue in dealing with the 
corrupt regime?”   31
government, but with the private individuals whose personal fortunes are the real 
counterpart of the debt.  
 
In adopting such a strategy, Africans can invoke as a precedent the US 
government’s stance a century ago toward the creditors of the erstwhile Spanish colonial 
regime in Cuba after the Spanish-American war: the creditors knew, or should have 
known, the risks they faced when they made the loans to the predecessor regime, and 
they “took the chances of the investment.”
16 Regarding the burden of proof, they can 
invoke the further precedent of the Tinoco Arbitration, in which U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice William Howard Taft ruled in favor of the Costa Rican government in a dispute 
over external credits that had been diverted for the personal use of the dictator Federico 
Tinoco and his brother: Taft required the creditor “to discharge the burden of proving that 
the Costa Rican governments had used the money for legitimate purposes, something 
which it could not do.”
17 
 
In effect, this strategy would accord symmetric treatment to Africa’s external 
assets and liabilities. On both sides of the balance sheet, the burden of proof in 
establishing the legitimacy of claims and realizing their face value would lie with the 
creditors: African governments seeking to reclaim flight capital, and banks and creditor 
governments seeking to collect debt-service payments. The case for symmetry is 
reinforced by the past complicity of sub-Saharan Africa’s external creditors in sustaining 
                                                 
16  For discussion, see Hoeflich (1982) and Ndikumana and Boyce (1998). 
 
17  Howse (2007, p. 15); for discussion, see also Buchheit et al. (2007).   32
the power of corrupt rulers and in helping them to spirit their ill-gotten gains abroad. As 
The Financial Times (2000) remarks, in an editorial comment on the freezing of General 
Abacha’s Swiss bank accounts, “Financial institutions that knowingly channeled the 
funds have much to answer for, acting not so much as bankers but as bagmen, complicit 
in the corruption that has crippled Nigeria.” Capital flight from Nigeria under the Abacha 
regime was simply a particularly egregious example of a more widespread phenomenon 
in the subcontinent. 
 
One concern with debt repudiation is the potential retaliation by lenders who may 
refuse to lend to countries whose governments opt to exercise the odious debt doctrine. 
However, this concern may be exaggerated. First, many African countries currently in 
fact receive little in terms of net flows of debt; indeed many are experiencing negative net 
transfers, paying more in debt service than they receive in new money. Thus such debtor 
countries can easily endure the “punishment” of credit rationing. Second, the invocation 
of the odious debt doctrine is not equivalent to unilateral across-the-board debt 
repudiation. Legitimate creditors have no reason to fear, given that all legitimate loans 
will be duly repaid. Applying the odious debt doctrine will enforce and reward 
responsible lending practices by western financial centers as well as transparent and 
responsible debt management by leaders in the South. Thus with respect to future lending 
the strategy will yield in a win-win outcome for lenders and borrowers. 
 
On the other hand, there is a risk that debtor countries would adopt an overly 
expansive definition of what constitutes an “odious debt” if they could repudiate such   33
debt unilaterally, without no recourse to legal proceedings to assess the merits of the case. 
Governments that abused the odious debt doctrine presumably would be denied further 
credit even for legitimate purposes, but this may not be a strong deterrent for the reason 
stated above. To address this concern, it would be useful to establish an international 
institution to adjudicate questions of debt legitimacy in postwar countries.
18  
 
The ex ante designation of “odious government” and “odious debt” 
 
Under the alternative strategy, an international referee “truthfully” announces 
whether a regime is odious or not. Creditors may lend to a government that has been 
designated odious, but they do so at their own risk. Successor governments not only can 
repudiate any such loans, but in fact would be required to repudiate all debts 
subsequently issued to the odious government, so as to prevent new loans and aid from 
being squandered on servicing odious debts. Kremer and Jayachandran (2002, 2003) 
claim that if the referee indeed assesses the legitimacy of the government truthfully and 
creditors act rationally, no or little odious debt will be issued in the market. The authors 
also argue that this mechanism is superior to conventional economic sanctions as it is less 
likely to affect adversely the population in the debtor country. 
 
                                                 
18 The Norwegian government has called for the creation of an ‘international debt settlement court’ for this 
purpose. See the Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy, October 2005;  available at 
http://www.dna.no/index.gan?id=47619&subid=0. In making a case for an ex ante instead of ex post odious 
debt strategy, Jayachandran and Kremer (2006, p. 83) express the worry that “any adjudicating body that 
had the power to declare debt void might nullify legitimate debt if it placed a high value on the welfare of 
the debtor country,” thereby shutting down access to legitimate loans and presumably harming the country. 
But actions yielding this result would seem to be a rather perverse form of favoritism. 
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This approach has several weaknesses as a strategy for addressing the problems of 
odious debt and capital flight. First and foremost, the strategy leaves the burden of past 
debts, a large portion of which may be odious, on the shoulders of the population of the 
debtor countries. On its own, this strategy would leave African countries trapped in the 
current debt crisis that resulted in large part from irresponsible borrowing by past regimes 
and complacent lending by Western financiers. The strategy therefore lets both 
beneficiary parties (past corrupt governments and their financiers) off the hook at no cost. 
 
Second, this approach may increase the risk of moral hazard in the debt market.  
Myopic rulers may borrow excessively if they have the green light to access external debt 
and if lenders have been assured that their loans are safe from being regarded as odious 
debts. Regimes not designated as odious may also divert some borrowing to private 
pockets, not only impairing the ability to repay the loans but also raising the issue of the 
responsibility of the population at large to service the resulting debts. 
 
Third, there may be some scope for legitimate lending even to regimes designated 
as odious, if such lending would benefit the people of the country. To ensure legitimacy, 
creditors would need to exercise due diligence, monitoring uses of the loan proceeds and 
suspending disbursements in case of misuse. By virtue of its all-or-nothing character, ex 
ante designation of odious governments would deter such lending; ex post repudiation, by 
contrast, could be selective. 
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Finally, it is difficult to find a competent and impartial institution that will assess 
“truthfully” the nature of existing governments. Western governments, multilateral 
institutions, and non-governmental organizations often have specific political interests in 
supporting client regimes, regardless of whether these regimes are democratic or not. 
Influential governments may paralyze the functioning of the referee institution by 
exercising their veto power when a ruling is likely to go against a client regime or when 
they want to enforce a particular outcome for a disfavored regime. In addition to obvious 
political interests, bias may arise in favor of economically powerful countries. For 
instance, any institution will hesitate to classify the government of a country like China 
or India as odious, given their importance in the international economic arena. In 
contrast, smaller countries, especially African countries, are likely to be 
disproportionately rationed out of the debt market under this approach. Consequently, 
such a strategy could increase the marginalization of Africa.  
 
6.  Summary and conclusion 
 
This paper has presented new evidence on the dramatic financial hemorrhage of 
African economies through capital flight countries over the past four decades. The 
estimates indicate that for the sample of 40 countries as a whole over the period 1970-
2004, real capital flight amounted to $420 billion (in 2004 dollars). Including imputed 
interest, the stock of capital flight for this group of countries reached a staggering $607 
billion dollars in 2004. This exceeds the countries’ combined external debt by $398 
billion, making Africa a “net creditor” to the rest of the world. For some countries,   36
including Angola, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, the stock of capital flight is more than four 
times the stock of external debt. 
 
The paper investigated the causes of capital flight and, consistent with past 
studies, found strong linkages between capital flight and external borrowing. The 
regression results suggest that out of every dollar of new borrowing, as much as 60 cents 
left the country in the form of capital flight the same year. Furthermore, a one-dollar 
increase in the stock of debt resulted in 3 to 4 cents of capital flight in subsequent years. 
The evidence has clear policy implications for addressing the challenge of heavy 
indebtedness for African countries. It suggests that a solution to the problem includes a 
combination of better management of debt by African governments, prevention of capital 
flight, and repatriation of African assets held abroad. 
 
The paper has advanced the strategy of challenging the legitimacy of parts of 
African debts based on three crucial arguments. First, the evidence of strong year-to-year 
correlations between external borrowing and capital flight implies that a substantial 
proportion of the borrowed funds ended up in private assets through debt-fueled capital 
flight. Thus, past borrowing practices failed the test of benefiting to the people. Second, 
historical evidence gives strong indications for complicity of the lenders, who in many 
instances were aware (or should have been aware) of the embezzlement and 
mismanagement of borrowed funds and the corrupt nature of the borrowing regimes. 
Thus, historical evidence establishes the test of creditor awareness. Third, the debts were 
borrowed in the name of the people without their consent, which is obvious in the case of   37
undemocratic regimes. These regimes only exercised their prerogatives of agents of the 
people in committing the nations to binding debt obligations, while reneging on their 
attendant obligation of acting in the interest of the people. Thus, borrowing practices did 
not meet the condition of consent by the people. Consequently, much of Africa’s 
accumulated debts may be deemed as odious and their legitimacy challenged by the 
people of debtor nations. 
 
We argue that the burden of proof of legitimacy of debts must rest on the lenders. 
Indeed given the practices of secrecy in western financial centers, it will be impossible 
for African governments to locate more than a very small fraction of the stolen funds that 
are stashed in foreign banks or other investments. Enforcing the doctrine of odious debt 
will result in a win-win situation for borrowers and lenders in future years. By inducing 
responsible lending by Western financial institutions and accountable debt management 
by African governments, the strategy will both maximize the gains from external 
resources for African economies and minimize the risk of default, maximizing profits for 
western bankers. As the African continent searches for ways to reach financial stability 
and increase resources for development financing, we believe that the strategies outlined 
in this paper for addressing the problem of capital flight must feature prominently in 
debates at the national level as well as in the international development assistance 
community.   38
References 
 
Ajayi, I. S., 1997. “An Analysis of External Debt and Capital Flight in the Severely 
Indebted Low Income Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,” IMF, Working Paper 
WP/97/68. 
Asiedu, E. and D. Lien, 2003. “Capital controls and foreign direct investment.” Mimeo, 
Department of Economics, University of Kansas. 
Asiedu, E., 2004a. “Policy reform and foreign direct investment to Africa: absolute 
progress but relative decline.” Development Policy Review, 22 (1): 41-48. 
Asiedu, R., 2004b. “The determinants of employment of affiliates of US multinational 
enterprises in Africa.” Development Policy Review, 22 (4): 371-380. 
Bank for International Settlement, 2007. “Locational Banking Statistics”, available online 
at http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm 
Boyce, J. K. and L. Ndikumana, 2001. “Is Africa a net creditor?  New estimates of capital 
flight from severely indebted sub-Saharan African countries, 1970-1996.” Journal 
of Development Studies, 38(2): 27-56. 
Boyce, J.K., 1992. “The revolving door?  External debt and capital flight: a Philippine 
case study.” World Development, 20 (3): 335-349. 
Buchheit, L.C., G.M. Gulati and R.B. Thompson, 2007. “The dilemma of odious debts.” 
Duke Law Journal, 56: 1201-1262. 
Chang, K.P.H., and R.E. Cumby, 1991. ‘Capital flight in sub-Saharan African countries,’ 
in Ishrat Husain and John Underwood, eds., African External Finance in the 
1990s. Washington, DC: World Bank, 162-187. 
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and C. Pattillo, 2001. “Flight capital as a portfolio choice,” 
World Bank Economic Review, 15 (1): 55-80. 
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and C. Pattillo, 2004. “Africa’s exodus: Capital flight and the 
brain drain as portfolio decisions.” Journal of African Economies, 13(2): 15-54. 
Fedderke, J.W. and W. Liu, 2002. “Modeling the determinants of capital flows and 
capital flight: with an application to South African data from 1960 to 1995.” 
Economic Modeling 19: 419-444. 
Henry, J., 1986. “Where the money went: Third World debt hoax,” The New Republic, 
(April 14), 20-23. 
Hermes, N. and R. Lensink, 1992. “The magnitude and determinants of capital flight: the 
case for six sub-Saharan African countries.” De Economist, 140 (4): 515-530. 
Higgins, M.L., A. Hysenbegasi, and S. Pozo, 2004. “Exchange-rate uncertainty and 
workers remittances.” Applied Financial Economics, 14: 403-411. 
Hoeflich, M.E., 1982. “Through a glass darkly: reflections upon the history of the 
international law of public debt in connection with state succession.” University of 
Illinois Law Review 1: 39-70.   39
Howse, R., 2007. “The concept of odious debt in public international law.” Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Discussion 
Paper No. 185. 
Howse, R., 2007. “The concept of odious debt in public international law.” Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Discussion 
Paper No. 185. 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2007. Sending Money Home: 
 Worldwide Remittance Flows to Developing and Transition Countries. Rome: 
 IFAD. Available at http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/brochure.pdf. 
 
International Monetary Fund 2007, Balance of Payment Statistics, CDROM edition. 
International Monetary Fund, 2007. Direction of Trade Statistics, CDROM edition. 
Jayachandran, S. and M. Kremer, 2006. “Odious debt.” American Economic Review, 
96(1): 82-92. 
Jochnick, C., 2006. “The legal case for debt repudiation.” In C. Jochnick and F.A. 
Preston, eds., Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 132-157. 
Kahn, B., 1991. “Capital flight and exchange controls in South Africa.” London: London 
School of Economics, Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and 
International Finance, Research Paper No. 4. 
Khalfan, A., 2003. “Advancing the odious debt doctrine.” CISDL Working Paper 
(March). 
King, J.A., 2007. “Odious debt: The terms of the debate.” North Carolina Journal of 
International Law & Commercial Regulation, 32: 605-668. 
Kremer, M. and S. Jayachandran, 2003. “Odious debt: When dictators borrow, who 
repays the loan?” Brookings Review, 21 (2). 
Kremer, M. and S. Jayachandran, 2002. “Odious debt.” NBER working paper 8953. 
Lessard, D.R. and J. Williamson (eds.), 1987. Capital Flight and Third World Debt. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.  
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1986. “LDC capital flight.” World Financial Markets 
(March), 13-15. 
Morisset, J., 2000. “Foreign direct investment in Africa: policies also matter.” 
Transnational Corporations, 9 (2): 107-125. 
Murinde, V., N. Hermes, and R. Lensink, 1996. “Comparative aspects of the magnitude 
and determinants of capital flight in six sub-Saharan African countries.” Saving 
and Development, 20 (1): 61-78. 
Ndikumana, L. and J.K. Boyce, 1998. “Congo’s odious debt: external borrowing and 
capital flight in Zaïre.” Development and Change, 29: 1995-217. 
Ndikumana, L., 2000. “Financial determinants of domestic investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa: evidence from panel data.” World Development, 28 (2): 381-400.   40
Ndikumana, L. and J.K. Boyce, 2003. “Public debts and private assets: explaining capital 
flight from sub-Saharan African Countries.” World Development, 31 (1): 107-130. 
Nyarko, Y., 2007. “Theoretical foundations of capital flight.” Paper presented at the 
Senior Policy Seminar on Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for 
Macroeconomic Management and Growth, Pretoria, October 30 – November 2. 
Sack, A.N., 1927. Les Effets de Transformations des Etats sur leur Dettes Publiques et 
Autres Obligations Financières. Paris: Recueil Sirey. 
The Financial Times, 1999. “Nigeria seeks help in tracing billions ‘taken’ by former 
military leaders.” 23 July, p. 5. 
UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), Economic Report on Africa 
2007: Accelerating Africa’s Development Through Diversification. Addis Ababa: 
UNECA. 
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and World Bank, 2007. Stolen 
Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Walker, R. and N. Nattrass, 2002. “Don’t owe, won’t pay! a critical analysis of the 
Jubilee SA position on South African government debt.” Development South 
Africa, 19 (4): 467-481. 
Watts, Robert, 2002. “Calling the Swiss to account.” Sunday Telegraph (London), 
November 10, accessed via LexisNexis. 
World Bank, 1985. World Development Report 1985. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank, Global Development Finance 2006. 
 
World Bank, World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006. 
 
World Bank, 2006. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of  
  Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank, 2007. Remittances Data Set.  Washington, DC: World Bank, Development   
Prospects Group. Available at  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-
1157133580628/RemittancesData_updated2007.xls 
   41
Table 1: Total capital flight (million 2004 dollars and % of GDP), stock of accumulated 
capital flight (million dollars and % of debt stock) over 1970-2004 period 
name real  KF 
stock of KF  
in 2004 
net foreign  
assets  




stock of  
KF/Debt  
(%) 
Angola 42178.8 50950.6 41430.0 215.6  535.2
Benin -3989.7 -7663.9 -9580.3 -98.6  -399.9
Botswana 1127.9 -1086.9 -1610.9 12.6  -207.4
Burkina Faso  3076.9 4670.6 2934.6 73.6  269.0
Burundi 2073.6 2566.6 1181.2 312.2  185.3
Cameroon 18378.9 27287.7 17791.8 116.5  287.4
Cape Verde  2190.9 2707.1 2190.1 231.1  523.6
Central African Republic  1943.8 2774.1 1696.4 148.7  257.4
Chad 1337.7 2345.6 644.3 31.1  137.9
Comoros -176.3 -168.7 -474.5 -47.8  -55.2
Congo, Dem. Rep.  19572.5 36737.6 24896.7 295.1  310.3
Congo, Rep.  14950.4 17474.8 11645.4 344.3  299.8
Cote d'Ivoire  34349.4 54000.6 42261.2 222.0  460.0
Ethiopia 17031.5 22526.0 15951.9 175.0  342.6
Gabon 8580.8 11997.6 7847.9 118.7  289.1
Ghana 8503.7 11208.4 4173.3 98.7  159.3
Guinea 551.2 1048.9 -2489.6 14.6  29.6
Kenya 2665.4 6369.3 -456.9 16.6  93.3
Lesotho 407.4 893.4 129.8 29.8  117.0
Madagascar 7430.9 9570.8 6108.5 170.3  276.4
Malawi 2527.8 3825.4 407.5 132.9  111.9
Mali -372.0 -425.4 -3741.8 -7.6  -12.8
Mauritania 2319.1 4006.0 1709.2 151.2  174.4
Mauritius -962.8 650.1 -1643.8 -16.0  28.3
Mozambique 10677.7 14273.4 9622.9 180.6  306.9
Niger -5975.7 -8732.6 -10682.6 -195.7  -447.8
Nigeria 165696.7 240781.0 204891.3 230.0  670.9
Rwanda 3366.8 5889.5 4233.8 183.5  355.7
Sao Tome and Principe  723.3 1059.1 696.9 1265.9  292.4
Senegal -8885.0 -13077.3 -17015.7 -114.3  -332.0
Seychelles 2700.9 2986.3 2371.5 384.1  485.7
Sierra Leone  4607.7 7005.4 5282.6 424.7  406.6
South Africa  18266.0 17492.3 7552.7 8.5  176.0
Sudan 9218.7 16325.0 -3006.7 43.0  84.4
Swaziland 1263.9 1342.6 872.5 50.2  285.6
Tanzania 5185.2 9963.4 2163.9 45.8  127.7
Togo -3481.6 -4064.6 -5876.9 -168.9  -224.3
Uganda 4982.0 6853.7 2031.4 73.0  142.1
Zambia 9769.5 19814.3 12535.5 180.2  272.2
Zimbabwe 16162.0 24556.0 19758.5 344.2  511.9
Sample total  419975.7 606733.7 398433.6 81.8  291.3
Notes: for Burkina Faso, last year where KF is available is 2003; so totals, stocks, and ratios refer to 2003 
Sources: Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; series updated (1997 to 2004) and sample expanded using 
information from: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics; IMF, 
Direction of Trade Statistics; IMF, various country online information in "Selected issues and statistical 
appendix"; World Bank, Global Development Finance; World Bank, World Development Indicators.   42
 
Table 2   External borrowing (annual flows) and capital flight 
 
  Regressions with debt flows 
(change in debt) 
Regressions with debt stock  Combined 
regression 
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(0.00) 




















































           














overall  R-sq  0.39 0.37 0.39  0.22 0.20 0.20  0.37 
between R-sq (FE)    0.71  0.77    0.69  0.67  0.60 
within R-sq (FE)     0.28  0.27    0.05  0.05  0.29 




The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
a OLS = with robust standard errors, taking account of outliers. 
b iv_FE = instrumental-variable fixed-effects estimation where change in debt and stock of debt are considered as endogenous. 
c The combined regression includes the second lag of the stock of debt, given that by construction, the change in debt is dependent on the contemporaneous and 
first lag of the stock of debt. 
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Credit/GDP     -0.037 
(0.27) 
  








      -0.005 
(0.28) 
overall R-sq  0.39  0.26  0.22  0.21  0.30 
between R-sq  0.49  0.17  0.18  0.08  0.40 
within R-sq  0.40  0.28  0.25  0.29  0.29 
          
observations 719  784  976  496 364 
  
Notes: 
The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
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Table 4: Regression results with an alternative proxy for capital flight (foreign bank liabilities) 
 
  Regressions with debt flows 
(change in debt) 
Regressions with debt stock  Combined 
regression 
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(0.00) 














































































overall  R-sq    0.754 0.681    0.710 0.752  0.65 
between R-sq 
(FE) 
  0.996 0.968    0.852 0.991  0.88 
within R-sq 
(FE)  
  0.469 0.342    0.488 0.474  0.65 
Observations  962  962 959  963  963 962  962 
 
Notes: 
The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
a OLS = with robust standard errors, taking account of outliers. 
b iv_FE = instrumental-variable fixed-effects estimation where change in debt is considered as endogenous. 




APPENDIX A: Algorithm for the computation of capital flight 
 
 
Definition of capital flight 
We define capital flight as the difference between total capital inflows and 
recorded foreign exchange outflows. In a given year t for a country i capital flight is 
computed as:  
) ( it it it it it RES CA DFI DEBTADJ KF Δ + − + Δ =                       (A1)  
where  DEBTADJ Δ is the change in total external debt outstanding adjusted for exchange 
rate fluctuations (see below), DFI is net direct foreign investment, CA is the current 
account deficit, and  RES Δ  is net additions to the stock of foreign reserves.  
 
Adjustment for exchange rate fluctuations 
To correct for potential discrepancies due to exchange rate fluctuations, we adjust 
the change in the long-term debt stock for fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dollar 
against other currencies. For country i, the U.S. dollar value of the beginning-of-year 
stock of debt at the new exchange rates is obtained as follows: 
1 , 1 ,
1 , 1 , 1 , , 1 ,
7
1
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
) / /(
) / /( ) * (
− −
− − − −
=




t i t i
t i t i t SDR t SDR t i
j
t j jt t i t ij t i
STDEBT LTUSD
LTMULT LTOTHER EX EX IMFCR
EX EX LTDEBT NEWDEBT α
                  (A2)    46
where LTDEBT is the total long-term debt;  ij α is the proportion of long-term debt held in 
currency j, for each of the seven non-US currencies;
1 EX is the end-of-year exchange rate 
of the currency of denomination against the dollar (expressed as units of currency per 
U.S. dollar); IMFCR is the use of IMF credit; LTOTHER is long-term debt denominated 
in other unspecified currencies; LTMULT is long-term debt denominated in multiple 
currencies; LTUSD is long-term debt denominated in U.S. dollars; and STDEBT is short-
term debt. 
 
The exchange rate adjustment is obtained as: 
1 1 − − − = t t t DEBT NEWDEBT ERADJ                                  (A3) 
We then obtain the adjusted change in debt as:  
t t t ERADJ DEBT DEBTADJ − Δ = Δ                                   (A4) 
Since  1 − − = Δ t t t DEBT DEBT DEBT , it follows that (4) is equivalent to: 
1 − − = Δ t t t NEWDEBT DEBT DEBTADJ                                 (A4’) 
 
Adjustment for debt write-offs 
We adjust the change in debt to account for debt write-offs, given that they reduce 
the stock of debt although they have no corresponding flow of debt service. Hence, they 
lead to an overstatement of debt service and an understatement of the change in debt 
obtained as the change in annual debt stocks over consecutive years. We add the value of 
                                                 
1 The seven currencies are the euro (from 2000); French franc and the Deutsche mark (up to 2000); Swiss 
franc, Yen, SDR, and British pound.   47
debt write-offs (absolute value, in 2004 dollars) to the estimated capital flight in equation 
(A1). 
 
Adjustment for trade misinvoicing  
We estimate trade misinvoicing by comparing the country’s export and import 
data to those of its trading partners.
2 We assume that the trade data from industrialized 
countries are relatively accurate, and interpret the discrepancy between these and the data 
from their African trading partners as evidence of misinvoicing. For an individual 
African country i in year t, export discrepancies with the industrialized countries (DXIC) 
are computed as follows: 
) * ( t it it it CIF XIC PXIC DXIC − =                           (A5)  
where PXIC is the value of the industrialized countries’ imports from the African country 
as reported by the industrialized trading partners, XIC is the African country’s exports to 
industrialized countries as reported by the African country, and CIF is the c.i.f/f.o.b 
factor, representing the costs of freight and insurance.
3 A positive sign on DXIC indicates 
export underinvoicing. 
 
Import discrepancies with the industrialized countries (DMIC) are computed as:  
) * ( t it it it CIF PMIC MIC DMIC − =                        (A6) 
                                                 
2 The trade misinvoicing adjustment could not be calculated in the case of South Africa due to lack of 
consistent data. 
 
3 The series for the c.i.f./f.o.b. factor reported in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks are in 
some cases anomalous both in terms of absolute values and year-to-year variations.  For example, the 
reported c.i.f./f.o.b. factor for Congo-Zaïre is higher than that of land-locked Burundi. Hence we use the 
average factor for each year for Africa as a whole in our computations. 
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where MIC is the African country’s imports from industrialized countries as reported by 
the African country, and PMIC is the industrialized countries’ exports to the African 
country as reported by the industrialized trading partners. A positive sign on DMIC 
indicates net overinvoicing of imports; a negative sign indicates net underinvoicing. 
 
  To obtain global totals, we multiply these discrepancies by the inverse of the 
average shares of industrialized countries in the African country’s exports (ICXS) and 
imports ICMS.
4 We obtain total trade misinvoicing as the sum of export discrepancies 










MISINV + =                         (A7) 
Adding trade misinvoicing to the initial estimate of capital flight from equation 
(A1) we obtain adjusted capital flight as: 
   it it it MISINV KF ADJKF + =                           (A8) 
 
Adjustment for underreporting of remittances 
A number of sub-Saharan African countries receive substantial inflows of 
remittances from their citizens who are working in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the 
United States and other industrialized countries. These inflows are often underreported in 
the African countries’ official balance-of-payments (BoP) statistics. Officially recorded 
                                                 
4  In some cases, the data reported in the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks show occasional 
wide, unexplained fluctuations in the shares of industrialized countries in some African countries’ exports 
and imports. In our calculations, we use the average shares for each country over the 1970-2004 period, 
except for the 30 countries contained in the Boyce and Ndikumana (2003) for which the average shares is 
for the 1997-2004 period (given that capital flight series for 1970-96 are taken from Boyce Ndikumana 
(2003) and only converted into 2004 dollars). 
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remittances enter into the BoP statistics primarily under three headings: “workers’ 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers.”
5 Econometric analysis 
suggests that underreporting in the BoP statistics is particularly large in Africa, with 
unrecorded remittances accounting for more than half of total remittance flows (World 
Bank, 2006: 92).  
 
Unrecorded remittance inflows have an effect on capital flight estimates 
analogous to that of unrecorded export earnings: the amount of foreign exchange entering 
the African country is greater than what is captured in the official BoP. This foreign 
exchange could be used to finance (recorded or unrecorded) imports, or it could enter the 
formal banking system and ultimately add to the central bank’s official reserves, or it 
could go into capital flight. Regardless of its actual use, omitting these inflows from 
residual-based estimates of capital would lead to underestimation of its true magnitude. 
 
Alternative estimates of remittance inflows have been reported by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2007). These were derived by 
combining data on total numbers and locations of migrant workers in 2006 with survey 
data, for various host-origin country pairs, on the percentage of migrants who send 
remittances and the average amount of these remittances. In general, these estimates 
                                                 
5 Summary BoP measures of remittance inflows and outflows for the years 1970-2006 are available from 
World Bank (2007). For discussion of the methodology by which these measures were extracted from the 
BoP accounts, see World Bank (2006, pp. 105-108). The World Bank (2006, p. 91) speculates that the 
share of formal (recorded) as opposed to informal (unrecorded) remittances rose in response tightened 
financial regulations after September 11, 2001. On the other hand, IFAD (2007, p. 7) suggests that by 
increasing the cost of using formal channels, the same regulatory changes may have led to greater reliance 
on informal remittance networks. In the absence of direct evidence on this matter, we assume no overall 
change in the share of unrecorded remittances. 
   50
support the view that the official BoP data understate the true magnitude of remittance 
flows, at times substantially. The IFAD estimate of the remittance inflows from 
industrialized countries to Nigeria in 2006 amounted to $5.4 billion, for example, 
compared to the BoP measure of $3.3 billion. In Angola, to take another example, the 
IFAD estimate shows an inflow of $969 million whereas the BoP data report no 
remittances whatsoever. 
 
The IFAD estimates include remittance inflows from all countries, including 
intra-African transfers. The data on number of migrants and their remittance behavior 
appears to be less reliable for intra-African flows. Accordingly, we estimate the volume 
of unreported remittances by comparing estimated inflows from industrialized countries 
to the total inflows recorded in the official BoP statistics.
6 In principle, the latter should 
be larger because it is meant to include remittances from the entire world, not only from 
the industrialized countries. Where, instead, the former estimates exceed the latter, we 
take this as strong evidence of underreporting. We calculate the discrepancy based on 
2006 data (the year for which the alternative estimates are available), and extrapolate 
from this to estimate discrepancies for earlier years based on the trend in overall African 
remittance inflows reported in the BoP statistics:  
2006 2006 , 2006 , / * ) ( BPRI BPRI BPRI ARI RID t i i it − =                                      (A9) 
where RIDit = remittance inflow discrepancy in country i in year t; ARIi, 2006 and BPRIi, 
2006 are the alternative and BoP measures, respectively, of remittance inflows in country i 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Dr. Manuel Orozco of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC, for providing 
us with the African remittance inflow estimates prepared for the IFAD study, disaggregated and cross-
tabulated by sending countries. 
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in the year 2006; and BPRIt and BPRI2006 are the BoP measures of remittance inflows to 
African countries as a whole in years t and 2006, respectively. 
 
Adding these estimated discrepancies to the adjusted estimate of capital flight 
from equation (A8) we obtain corrected capital flight as: 
 
it it it RID ADJKF CADJKF + =                                                                           (A10) 
 
Inflation adjustment 
To make annual capital flight estimates comparable over an extended period of 
time, we convert nominal flows to constant dollars, using the US producer price index for 
this purpose. Real capital flight (adjusted for trade misinvoicing) is calculated as: 
t it it PPI CADJKF RADJKF / =                         (A11)  
 
where PPI is the US producer price index (base 2004=1.00). 
 
Adjustment for interest earnings 
We compute the stock of interest-earnings adjusted capital flight (SADJKF) as follows: 
   it it t i it CADJKF TBILL SADJKF SADJKF + + = − ) 1 ( 1 ,                 (A12) 
where TBILL  is the interest rate on short-term US Treasury bills. 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Table B1: Real capital flight (million 2004 $) for 40 sub-Saharan African countries, 1970-2004 
 
 
YEAR  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Angola           
Benin       81.1 -4.6  -178.7 -94.7 -161.4
Botswana        -131.4  -129.6 -45.9 -375.2
Burkina Faso  58.2  57.5 17.8 22.9 140.9 -51.5 -14.3 124.7 197.3
B u r u n d i            
Cameroon -88.6  -26.7 -298.2 -537.3 -16.8 194.0 -95.0 588.7 225.0
C a p e   V e r d e            
Central African 
Republic -16.0  21.9 26.4 89.1 -3.6 -3.0 42.2 -18.7 -14.0
Chad          136.5 174.0
C o m o r o s            
Congo, Dem. Rep.  936.9  321.1 992.7 2204.7 1778.4 166.0 592.0 -1695.7 2445.6
Congo, Rep.    -48.0 -2.5 143.7 -256.4 -535.7 -944.0 -2.4 382.1
Cote d'Ivoire  310.3  356.1 449.5 555.4 283.8 992.5 674.6 2284.2 1645.4
Ethiopia 47.3  -0.2 -598.4 100.0 -102.1 -54.6 -212.3 -61.5 113.3
Gabon           531.8
Ghana -41.7  -317.1 385.2 443.0 -683.3 215.2 -356.1 257.5 128.7
G u i n e a            
Kenya 49.0  111.7 104.0 479.9 611.7 539.8 423.2 143.8 282.8
Lesotho        6.6  -74.9 -0.8 40.9
Madagascar 37.4  1601.3 322.3 -84.6 763.7 244.5 -1484.5 1711.5 -1243.6
Malawi 15.1  104.1 -38.5 187.9 166.8 229.2 193.1 194.7 80.5
Mali 70.0  -98.8 61.8 94.5 60.6 -62.1 -140.4 -20.8 24.0
Mauritania      351.6 471.7 -239.2  274.0 82.0 108.5
Mauritius         177.2 135.9 154.8
M o z a m b i q u e            
Niger 63.4  71.8 95.4 119.6 -207.7 -222.9 -368.2 -369.5 1.2
Nigeria -521.3  -610.4 755.5 4206.5 1696.8 2249.3 4910.0 10595.5 4981.9
Rwanda -119.8  37.6 30.6 41.5 42.0 84.7 96.2 150.7 351.2  53
Sao Tome and 
P r i n c i p e            2 9 . 5
Senegal       -379.1 -77.7  -255.8 73.2 -117.4
S e y c h e l l e s            
Sierra Leone  55.2  278.0 43.8 348.6 218.5 -12.1 127.8 144.6 57.0
South Africa    -2285.0 -1724.2 -509.2 -1069.3 -4479.3 -1355.2 1634.4 1618.3
Sudan 52.0  123.3 -260.5 133.0 774.2 311.1 353.3 237.0 -248.1
Swaziland       96.0 68.1  48.2 63.6 65.3
Tanzania         608.9 605.6 698.7
Togo       184.5 -211.0  32.7 314.6 108.5
Uganda  244.9 78.0 7.1 157.0 73.7 -26.8 59.5 -351.9 -104.3
Zambia 1597.4  1534.0 125.3 304.1 -447.1 136.6 115.6 729.2 570.0
Zimbabwe          188.6 567.7
Total  2749.7 1310.2 494.9  8852.0 4279.0 -674.5  3119.5 17734.5 13320.3
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Table B1: (Continued) 
 
YEAR  1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Angola         3085.2  1103.7 3564.3
Benin  -187.0 -683.3 -606.8 -882.0 -105.7 -107.9 -195.2 -64.4 -63.5
Botswana  -89.5 -205.2 -167.5 -188.1 -220.8 -108.1 -73.9 -100.0 427.5
Burkina 
Faso  46.8 166.0 104.7 96.3 70.0 61.2 -49.2 65.6 48.2
Burundi         116.3  140.5 235.4
Cameroon  -365.7 358.8 335.3 454.5 816.5 2275.3 -199.7 2571.6 1563.2
Cape  Verde      77.0 74.3 71.1 17.9  64.7 81.4
Central 
African 
Republic  3.2 5.7  167.0 86.1 66.3 76.1 47.9  16.9 70.1
Chad  104.1 92.6  -0.7 -20.9 54.2 -23.3 16.5 48.5 91.3
Comoros    -1.3 3.3 -1.7 3.7 -10.6 6.9 9.5 5.3
Congo, 
Dem.  Rep.  1043.9 1221.4 2117.0 747.7 503.1 75.0 1041.4 570.1 780.1
Congo, Rep.  370.0  613.2  -183.1 804.9 560.3 900.4 885.4 -280.1 1139.6
Cote d'Ivoire  332.4  1557.3  363.5 1143.1 246.6 279.6 836.2 1198.2 2013.5
Ethiopia -20.2  -83.2  982.4 1985.6 823.0 322.5 909.4 581.8 1662.7
Gabon 790.9  473.4  66.9 270.0 366.9 -37.8 42.7 -321.9 311.5
Ghana 316.2  552.9  -558.7 283.3 691.7 734.6 89.8 -382.9 672.7
Guinea          159.5 277.6
Kenya 25.7  164.5  -316.0 -80.4 353.6 -421.5 783.6 -231.8 735.8
Lesotho  40.0 61.7 35.0 82.7 39.8 16.5 22.6 9.6 117.5
Madagascar  14.8 -224.4 -364.7 16.7 -57.7 338.8 89.2 212.7 496.4
Malawi -382.6  -48.9  -14.7 13.9 125.6 -79.5 182.7 192.5 229.6
Mali -235.8  98.7  108.1 60.5 128.2 262.6 -139.6 -297.0 -104.1
Mauritania -98.7  30.4  -11.0 114.1 143.0 172.4 117.4 -47.9 31.9
Mauritius  125.7 204.2 421.1 164.8 53.6 42.9 25.7 -0.4 -209.7
Mozambique      -369.3 -18.6 1060.3 1671.9  234.8 217.1
Niger -549.9  101.3  -212.6 -419.0 33.8 56.4 17.2 -106.1 -241.1
Nigeria -359.7  2776.0  10997.1 -280.6 3634.7 758.4 3131.1 7035.3 7032.7
Rwanda 389.8  279.8  -8.6 67.2 60.2 110.7 122.6 171.1 202.1  55
 
Sao Tome 
and  Principe 43.9 51.1 13.8 3.5 23.8 26.9 21.8 28.3 34.5
Senegal  -581.4 -156.2 -210.4 -319.4 -155.5 -145.5 -500.7 -185.5 -60.0
Seychelles     -34.0 63.9 -3.9 49.3 100.0  109.1 88.6
Sierra  Leone  91.7 127.9 136.7 -131.1 153.5 98.0 15.5 119.8 175.1
South Africa  3960.3  2926.0  -4554.4 -3806.2 -1674.5 -562.9 3394.3 4274.0 3240.4
Sudan 626.5  1154.5  348.9 -210.0 -111.5 1615.3 457.4 -186.0 688.1
Swaziland -22.8  -177.1  -7.4 -129.9 -118.0 -138.2 10.6 88.9 156.5
Tanzania  -29.2 857.8 702.6 494.2 847.2 648.3 2483.6 -6800.4 55.3
Togo 184.8  -58.0  -109.6 -282.3 -436.4 -228.1 -103.5 -158.3 -96.1
Uganda 373.7  80.9  251.6 227.2 205.1 299.8 40.2 87.8 378.7
Zambia 1136.2  -261.0  1097.6 -521.6 102.7 381.6 363.3 1312.3 1014.7
Zimbabwe -22.6  395.9  1130.1 1224.0 730.8 561.1 279.9 668.6 1275.4
Total  7075.3 12453.5 12022.4 838.7 8009.6 9432.0 19164.1 11912.7 28339.8
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Table B1: (Continued) 
 
YEAR  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Angola  944.5 1619.2 1202.5 2688.1 2579.5 2113.7 2135.3 2182.4 5003.5
Benin -111.3  343.4  -83.5 -203.5 -16.8 -191.6 129.3 173.8 -28.9
Botswana -213.1  -19.6  -307.6 -24.7 -257.1 -249.0 119.2 209.7 -29.5
Burkina 
Faso  -2.4 278.8 102.7 -26.8 169.5 111.3 183.1 570.9 284.0
Burundi 50.0  63.6  155.1 76.6 118.5 136.5 87.4 282.7 -1.0
Cameroon  591.0 1676.0 1365.2 1080.6 1957.3 628.8 1706.0 598.7 489.7
Cape Verde  72.7  38.4  130.2 128.8 111.1 99.1 61.2 149.4 55.7
Central 
African 
Republic  51.7 -2.5  93.9 108.5 -74.8 -2.6 75.5  569.6 281.3
Chad  169.8 19.3  160.3 93.3 87.6 9.3 54.8 56.3 76.5
Comoros  -0.6  3.9 -0.3 21.8 -1.2 16.1 75.5 -7.9 1.5
Congo, 
Dem. Rep.  -490.9  -23.6  1483.4 869.3 752.4 532.0 335.5 973.4 -961.1
Congo, Rep.  -331.7  363.0  -77.2 56.1 577.5 210.4 -140.7 455.7 -1430.8
Cote  d'Ivoire 1226.2 1654.4 3211.4 2065.4 1566.4 1858.0 -118.7 2029.6 735.5
Ethiopia -422.2  -202.3  702.3 584.8 685.5 484.7 675.6 228.3 79.3
Gabon  -122.6 329.0 486.6 204.6 -120.6 -50.7 480.7 131.8 323.7
Ghana  -163.6 604.9 436.9 -24.8 489.6 47.8 487.1 350.4 691.8
Guinea 81.9  24.5  228.7 64.8 34.6 317.6 105.8 8.0 -71.0
Kenya  -275.5 255.6 558.4 169.5 -146.6 -110.1 -142.4 75.3 -735.9
Lesotho 46.4  96.6  162.7 126.1 54.2 -2.0 93.3 -105.3 -125.7
Madagascar 4.2  24.4  296.7 635.5 548.2 556.1 479.1 668.7 -41.8
Malawi  189.1 417.1 155.3 -176.6 -170.0 -90.5 -310.3 392.0 121.9
Mali -322.6  -153.8  114.7 -54.8 363.3 -7.8 49.1 118.2 -96.8
Mauritania 2.6  -31.2  252.1 49.0 -241.2 261.9 109.5 192.7 202.3
Mauritius -139.3  -197.4  86.8 -28.9 26.8 -134.3 -123.7 50.4 -125.8
Mozambique -227.7 -150.9  1792.0 563.2 1010.1 584.5 2731.4 571.4 496.4
Niger -151.2  -281.6  51.2 -285.8 65.7 -63.0 -66.3 -132.5 -454.9
Nigeria  2887.1 3390.5 6663.7 10263.0 9873.0 5266.8 3753.1 2267.7 5272.3
Rwanda  201.2 125.2 180.0 147.5 38.9 -0.6 -15.2 121.9 112.8  57
 
Sao Tome 
and Principe  26.6  48.6  7.0 37.7 39.5 32.2 12.6 25.3 -7.3
Senegal  -630.9 -183.4 -138.7 -587.1 -602.0 -688.8 -229.0 -40.2 -506.1
Seychelles 193.4  -237.7  99.6 167.7 50.3 -42.9 129.8 114.4 -58.4
Sierra  Leone 92.3 84.7 88.9 326.3 488.1 222.8 148.8 -162.7 178.9
South Africa  3304.0  635.9  2164.5 2358.4 2720.9 4763.7 1300.3 -1727.4 2146.3
Sudan 70.7  2521.1  971.9 -229.6 140.8 177.6 94.9 -228.2 -1350.9
Swaziland 133.8  138.0  53.1 149.9 -76.4 86.8 84.6 10.8 -36.5
Tanzania 874.4  110.8  50.7 -207.1 -4.3 93.1 286.3 299.6 134.4
Togo -63.6  216.4  -139.9 -349.7 -51.9 -173.7 63.7 189.0 -54.3
Uganda -238.1  -11.8  227.4 47.7 97.4 231.8 296.6 75.4 -26.8
Zambia  1008.1 2010.2 1096.5 174.7 42.5 -593.6 883.0 -434.6 -170.2
Zimbabwe  347.3 946.1 535.5 682.4 1462.8 733.2 70.4 751.5 630.8
Total  8661.7 16543.7 24620.5 21741.7 24389.0 17174.3 16152.2 12056.2 11004.8
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Table B1: (Continued) 
 
YEAR  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Angola -98.6  1840.3  788.5 910.8 1882.3 2525.5 3345.3 2763.1
Benin  -39.5 -230.6 -227.5 -74.5 118.4 -17.3 -148.1 -127.4
Botswana  169.1 200.5 223.8 211.6 431.6 630.2 759.5 681.0
Burkina 
Faso 22.8  227.5  98.4 -215.9 -39.0 -6.1 155.2   
Burundi 68.5  119.7  33.9 71.9 -58.3 240.8 224.0  -88.6
Cameroon 2404.2  826.6  -213.9 454.1 -1464.6 -155.8 -848.5 -471.6
Cape  Verde 261.7 74.1 88.3 56.7 96.9 111.2 210.6 58.6
Central 
African 
Republic  30.5  43.6 -5.6 -67.2 -19.4 266.5 -65.1 -4.0
Chad 52.9  14.3  2.9 -54.7 34.4 -612.7 54.7  446.2
Comoros -193.3  -196.3  -10.8 14.9 44.1 41.0 -8.8 8.9
Congo, 
Dem. Rep.  -581.2  432.8  -660.8 -143.8 -1394.7 412.3 1092.1 1104.1
Congo,  Rep. 1087.7 1065.8 1202.3 1172.2 347.3 769.4 2343.9 3732.2
Cote d'Ivoire  1600.8  22.2  -633.8 -457.0 -506.0 976.5 3052.6 543.8
Ethiopia 375.8  375.5  -596.9 457.6 1153.6 2437.5 1857.2 1759.9
Gabon  701.2 358.4 294.5 725.4 34.6 522.2 358.0  1429.7
Ghana -107.4  430.2  -379.1 235.8 425.7 985.6 753.7 808.4
Guinea 151.2  107.6  -191.8 -357.3 -212.4 45.8 -139.2 -84.7
Kenya 179.7  660.8  -475.9 -179.9 -1270.1 424.0 250.8 -331.3
Lesotho -182.9  -143.7  -24.2 -63.9 -289.5 199.1 79.2 89.7
Madagascar  290.0 515.3 568.2 -100.8 -180.8 592.2 509.3 -323.1
Malawi  -314.9 461.3 210.2 -113.2 17.9 41.3 156.0 189.8
Mali  243.3 -131.4 -241.5 -394.2 -148.8 294.5 -20.5  146.6
Mauritania 187.9  -78.0  247.3 -7.6 -211.0 329.9 -122.4 -324.7
Mauritius 174.1  235.3  -322.9 -614.8 236.7 -348.0 -399.7 -634.1
Mozambique 1137.3  948.2  -1960.7 -133.1 852.4 368.3 -138.4 -562.7
Niger  -270.3 -124.5 -192.9 -445.7 -455.2 -416.1 -236.0 -379.8
Nigeria  1583.3 1495.4 4693.1 9668.2 3991.9 5101.4 20769.1 5768.2
Rwanda  22.5 76.6 32.0 63.4 9.6 59.6 31.2 50.8  59
 
Sao Tome 
and  Principe  8.0 50.5 88.5 21.9 3.3 37.2 -6.2 21.2
Senegal -347.6  136.8  -329.9 -971.7 206.7 190.9 -351.9 -740.7
Seychelles  104.7 182.5 253.3 318.0 98.8 424.5 259.4 270.6
Sierra  Leone 259.3 323.3 108.7 -86.6 -51.7 143.8 174.7 219.8
South Africa  -2826.0  -2087.5 -398.6 2035.7 12307.8 2426.6 1825.7 
-
11711.7
Sudan  -1286.6 -384.8 -763.8 167.6 -308.2 -245.3 1121.1 2891.9
Swaziland 157.5  -122.4  75.7 -54.1 8.8 239.7 182.2  228.9
Tanzania  -62.2 843.0 516.8 4.5 -643.9 319.3 590.6 806.4
Togo -178.7  -45.2  -166.3 -449.4 -398.6 -280.9 -564.5 -176.0
Uganda 210.0  -14.1  -115.0 540.4 -69.9 651.2 835.6 162.1
Zambia -444.4  512.6  -384.2 -337.1 -1603.9 -1325.3 -473.1 517.4
Zimbabwe  1885.6 1875.1 1035.8 268.0 -125.1 -686.9 -1278.3 28.3










Sources: Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; series updated (1997 to 2004) and sample expanded using information from: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, 
Balance of Payments Statistics; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; IMF, various country online information in "Selected issues and statistical appendix"; World 
Bank, Global Development Finance 
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Table B2: Regression variables: Summary statistics and sources 
 




1218 7.16 22.53 -158.67 188.66 Authors’  calculations (see Appendix A) 
Total 
debt/GDP (%) 
1287  106.61 88.75 .79 806.16 Global Development Finance (CDROM); 
IFS for South Africa 
Change in 
debt/GDP (%) 
253 8.04 16.28 -143.60 162.13 Authors’  calculations from total debt 
adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 




820 28.08 111.53 .12 1392.39 Authors’  computation using data from 
WDI as the absolute value of the 
difference between actual inflation and 
predicted inflation (obtained from a linear 




1096 25.34 21.91 -77.38 144.25 WDI 
Interest rate 
differential 
862 14.91 162.97 -19.07 4000.07 Computed  using data from WDI as: (real 
US Tbill rate) – (real deposit rate for the 
African country) 
Fuel exports 
(% of total 
exports) 
584  16.46 28.11 .00007 99.66 World Bank Africa Database (“mineral 
fuels”, SITC Section 3) 





(% of GDP) 
1047  8.91 8.11 0 82.35 Bank for International Settlements:  
http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.
 